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BOOK REVIEWS 
The Moral Gap by John Hare. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. Pp. x,292. 
EILEEN SWEENEY, Boston College 
The "moral gap" refers to the distance between the moral demand on us 
and our abilities to fulfill its commands. Without some way of filling the 
gap, we will necessarily fail in our pursuit of morality, and the obligation 
and motivation to morality will distintegrate. The gap is filled by God's 
assistance. That is the structure of the overall argument of John Hare's 
book, which has in effect two theses. First, he puts forward an interpreta-
tion of Kant which functions as a correction to the standard interpretations 
of Kant which regularly ignore the Christian content of his writings. This 
interpretation places the problem of the moral gap (and the attempt to 
solve it) at the center of Kant's ethics. Second, there is, he claims at the out-
set, something to be learned from what he calls "traditional Christianity" 
by those interested in ethics in general who reject or prescind from 
Christian or theistic belief. This something is the fact that being moral 
requires belief in "extra-human assistance." Hare attempts to establish this 
conclusion by arguing for the inadequacy of attempts to get around the 
problem by "puffing up the capacity" of humans to fulfill the moral 
demand, by reducing the demand of morality to the point where we are 
capable of fulfilling it, or, lastly, by constructing some substitute for God's 
assistal1.ce to bridge the gap. Hare also argues that Kant's solution, found 
in his translation of the doctrines of Christianity into the religion of pure 
reason, is inadequate. Hare's own solution is that found in the Christian 
doctrines of atonement, justification, and sanctification. 
a. Kant and the "moral gap" 
Our inability to live the moral life as Kant understands it is at least 
nominally admitted by most readers of Kant. Once admitted, however, it 
is then shrugged off as irrelevant to what ethicists take to be their main 
task, to determine what duty requires. At most philosophers tend to admit 
that according to Kant it is difficult to know whether we have acted from 
rather than merely according to duty. But it is clear from Hare's exposition 
of Kant's Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone that the difficulty is not 
only a matter of knowledge or even that some of our decisions might be 
motivated by inclination rather than duty. We come to moral decisions as 
depraved rather than as merely neutral or incompletely good; in Kant's 
language, "the ultimate subjective ground of all maxims is postulated as 
corrupt."! Like Kierkegaard, Hare argues that not just in Kant but per se the 
issue of whether and how we can be moral belongs at the center of ethical 
discourse. 
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There are a number of objections that can be made to the problem of the 
moral gap that divine assistance solves. First, if Kant is wrong about our 
moral abilities, there is in fact no moral gap to be filled. This sort of objec-
tion is relegated to the second section of the book which is devoted to theo-
ries which "puff up the capacity." All the views considered by Hare are 
post-Kantian in origin and respond, Hare gives the impression, to problems 
created by Kant. If Hare's point were the historical one, that all ethical 
thinkers in the West after Kant had to respond to his construction of morali-
ty, I would agree that such a case could be made, but Hare seems to want to 
make broader claims. First, he wants to show that the moral gap in the 
extreme terms described by Protestant Christianity (what Hare calls "tradi-
tional Christianity") is the true picture and second, that it is "traditional 
Christianity" which has revealed this gap between 'ought' and 'can'. Hare 
writes, "If we had not had the history of traditional Christianity behind us, 
it would have been more natural to propose a theory in which full-fledged 
morality was what humans are capable of by their own devices .... "2 He 
admits in a footnote that this structure "is not unique to Christianity" and 
cites Aristotle's comments at the end of the Nicomachean Ethics about the 
best life which would be more than human, an aspiration we ought, howev-
er, not to abandon in favor of the merely human and merely mortaP Most 
moral theories, I think, refer to some sort of "moral gap," and the differ-
ences between them have to do with how that gap is described and the 
strategies devised for living with it or closing it. Thus it may not be that 
Christianity displays first and best the moral predicament (as Hare seems to 
think, despite the footnote) but that Christianity reiterates in its own terms 
the already established nature of human moral aspirations. 
Moreover, one way of dealing with the moral gap not considered by 
Hare is simply to let it be. For example, for Aristotle, one could argue, the 
gap is not nearly so large as that described by Hare (who, again, despite his 
disclaimer, paints a distinctly Protestant picture of human propensity 
toward evil). Further, human beings are asked to tolerate the gap that 
there is while making a greater effort toward virtue, always recognizing 
insuperable human imperfection, an imperfection Aristotle was not moved 
to eradicate either from the human or divine side of the gap. Aristotle still 
finds that we can be moral and happy in human terms, a human happiness 
which may, paradoxically, require that our reach always and finally 
exceeds our grasp. Plato too, one might argue, portrays human beings as 
failing to live up to the fully good life. Plato is closer to Kant in plotting a 
larger gap than Aristotle and in arguing that attempting to live the moral 
life requires belief in a last judgement cementing the relationship between 
virtue and happiness. The Gorgias and Republic close with myths describ-
ing the meting out of complete justice for the good and the evil, not 
because being moral requires a reward beyond its effects in this life, but 
because it requires belief in the order and rationality of the cosmos. 
Nonetheless, Plato leaves us with the tension between the reality of human 
failure and the clear and undeniable superiority of the virtuous life. In 
these two examples, we see that Christianity is not the originator of the gap 
and that there are other responses than those found in Luther, Calvin, and 
Kierkegaard. While I am myself sympathetic to the view that the moral 
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gap is somewhat wider than that described by Aristotle, and is one which 
requires a response other than the counsel to keep trying to meet one's eth-
ical ideals, Hare's somewhat parochial way of delineating that gap and 
closing it makes his case less convincing than it might otherwise be. The 
case for the moral gap and divine assistance in closing it would have better 
served by a more inclusive account of the moral gap, one which did not 
rely solely on Kant's account of it. 
Hare's exposition of Kant's construction of and attempts to close the 
moral gap is the most convincing part of the book. Hare sees Kant as rais-
ing the issue of divine assistance on two fronts. For Kant being moral 
requires two kinds of faith in God: first, that which most literally fills the 
moral gap described by Hare, the belief that "'Heaven will find the means 
to make up our deficiency'." The second is the belief that one's future hap-
piness is not inconsistent with the attempt to live the morallife.4 Hare con-
tends that the second kind of faith requires the first "because morality 
requires its followers not only to pursue both duty and happiness, but to 
give duty priority over their other commitments. The first kind of moral 
faith allows her to believe that she can give morality this kind of priority 
[i.e., duty over happinessl, and that this revolution of the will has actually 
been accomplished in her."s 
The moral gap gives rise in Kant to the antinomy that it is both neces-
sary and impossible for God to intervene on our behalf.6 This is because of 
what Hare calls a "troublesome triad" of beliefs Kant holds: "first, God is 
just, and not indulgent; second, we humans have all lived under the evil 
maxim; third, God gives us a share in the highest good which is justly 
given only as a reward for holiness in an entire life."7 That holiness can 
only be achieved by a "revolution" of the will in which we do not become 
merely better but "other" or "new" men and women. How, then, can we 
reform and deserve happiness, according to Kant? Kant argues, Hare 
explains, that there is a kind of atonement whereby the new man suffers 
for the old, repaying the debt and justifying the new man. This is the 
translation of the doctrine of the incarnation back into the religion of pure 
reason, but for Kant its translation into the religion of pure reason cannot 
involve the suffering of someone else for us; payment for evil is not trans-
ferable as other debts are. Hence, the same person who committed the evil 
must suffer, and that means that not even the new man post-conversion 
can suffer for the old because morally he is no longer the same person. 
Kant writes, " since the infliction of punishment can ... take place neither 
before nor after the change of heart, and is yet necessary, we must think of 
it as carried out during the change of heart itself."" The suffering is the 
pain the new man has living the life of virtue, in Hare's words, "partly 
because of the remaining pull of the old way of life and partly because of 
the residue of unfinished business from past failure."9 What Kant leaves 
unexplained is what brings about that change of heart. It cannot be 
prompted by grace, Hare argues, since Kant holds to the so-called "Stoic 
maxim," "that a person herself must make or have made herself into what-
ever, in a moral sense, whether good or evil, she is to become."lo "Calling 
to assistance of works of grace," Kant writes, "cannot be adopted into the 
maxims of reason, if she is to remain within her limits."l1 Kant ultimately 
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concedes that the transformation from evil to good is as incomprehensible 
as the Fall from good to evilY My own view is that Kant is right and right 
to say that this is the point at which philosophy reaches its limit. Thus I 
would not construe the outcome as a failure on Kant's part, as Hare does, 
any more than the other antonomies represent a failure to solve a problem. 
The second kind of moral faith, believing that pursuit of duty will result 
in happiness, leads Kant to "practical proof" for God's existence. Hare sup-
ports Kant's view up to a certain point, arguing that living the moral life 
requires the belief in moral order, though not necessarily a moral ordererY 
Here Hare attempts to offer independent support to the need for belief in 
moral order in a peculiar way: he makes a quasi-empirical argument that 
those who have managed to continue to strive to live a moral life even in 
extreme conditions, for example, victims of the Holocaust, have had this 
kind of moral faith.14 Hare argues that Kant himself is unclear whether this 
faith can be supported transcendentally or empirically, but his case is based 
on Kant's use of Spinoza as an example of the attempt to live the moral life 
without the belief in God; the discontinuity between what the good deserve 
and what they get, Kant implies, undermines the ability to continue to live 
the morallifeY I do not think Kant offers this as empirical evidence of the 
necessity of such faith, but as an example illustrating the problem of living 
the moral life without it. The belief in moral order is a response to an antin-
omy, that it is both necessary and impossible to know whether the good 
will be rewarded with happiness, and as Hare himself points out, it is 
inconsistent with Kantian method to solve an antinomy empirically. 
Moreover, there is something problematic about the argument that 
those who believe in God and in moral order are more successful at main-
taining their moral standards. Greek tragedy contains an important and 
edifying truth, as do the cases of those who in anguish were driven to 
question their deepest beliefs in the goodness of the universe by tremen-
dous and undeserved suffering. To be immune to that kind of doubt is to 
be lacking in a certain kind of humanity. I guess that only means that 
those who are gifted with such faith must know it as faith, not as empirical-
ly verifiable or probable or even beneficial to their moral health. The evi-
dence for the contrary view is strong indeed. Though Hare does not 
explicitly claim anything different, even the attempt to support the exis-
tence of moral faith empirically seems to move in such a direction. 
b. "Puffing up the capacity" and "reducing the demand" 
The first theory that Hare considers under those exaggerating human 
ability to act morally is utilitarianism. He focuses not on utilitarianism's way 
of determining the moral demand, producing the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number, but on the difficulty of actually fulfilling this demand, i.e., 
that in the moral calculus of the greatest happiness, I cannot count my inter-
ests more than those of others. This way of considering utilitarianism makes 
it conflict directly with Kant's account of our moral defect, that of preferring 
our own happiness over duty; Hare, of course, agrees (as he thinks Kant 
does) that moral judgements must be impartial but argues that we cannot 
reach impartiality without divine assistance. Hare considers Shelly Kagan's 
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attempt to defend utilitarianism from the objection that it requires an 
unachievable impartiality.16 Kagan argues that we can come to consider oth-
ers' happiness as much as our own in the same way we can come to consider 
our long term interests as much as our short term pleasure: by making the 
more distant sets of interests as vivid as the more immediate ones. Hare 
argues, convincingly I think, that this process of becoming more vividly 
aware of my effect on others will not produce impartiality. First, Hare con-
tends that I might have a very vivid sense of how my actions will affect oth-
ers, but that this alone does not guarantee that I will consider another's dis-
pleasure as equal to my own, if, for example, I am negatively or even indif-
ferently disposed toward that person. Second, while developing such vivid 
understanding might make others' suffering weigh more in my more calcu-
lus, there is no reason to think it would become as important to me as my 
own. For Hare, moving toward such a goal asymptotically is inconsistent 
with utilitarianism, which requires total impartiality, and untenable in gen-
eral. In order to make the moral life our goal, we have to be able to reach 
that goal, not simply try, try, try to reach it. 
Hare goes on to consider a series of other views grounding morality in at 
least some of our desires. He makes some good points along the way. For 
example, he argues the naturalist's list of the desires which are natural and, 
hence, should be furthered, is incomplete. That list of natural desires, "to 
live autonomously, to have deep personal relations, to accomplish some-
thing with their lives, to enjoy themselves,"]7 Hare argues, is too parochial, 
leaving out intellectual, communal and religious values; it is, in short, the list 
"of an individualist, achievement-directed, secular Westemer."18 Second, 
Hare contends, the list is "too benign," leaving out the all-too-active desires 
for power and prestige.19 These objections to the list, I take it, are meant to 
show that there are inconsistencies between our desires, including down-
right evil desires, and our moral duty to self and others, disqualifying 'natur-
al' desire as a possible guide to morality. Of course, the naturalist might 
argue, as Plato and Aristotle do, that the desire for power over others and 
that the desire for prestige are not primitive desires but mistaken or incom-
plete replacements for the natural desire for virtuous fulfillment. 
This entire section on utlitarianism and naturalism is ultimately about 
original sin. Hare along with Kant sees human beings as tainted, inclining 
toward evil, while, at least on Hare's description, utilitarians and naturalists 
do not. I think Hare should simply be more overt about the real source of 
the debate. Further, it is not clear what could constitute a proof or even par-
tial evidence of one conclusion over the other. It comes down to what seems 
more inexplicable in each accounts. Is human evil adequately explained by 
the naturalists? Is human goodness adequately explained by the Calvinist? 
Hare, like Pascal, thinks Christianity explains both. Pascal states the case 
directly and succinctly: "Is it not as clear as day that man's condition is dual? 
The point is that if man had never been corrupted, he would, in his inno-
cence, confidently enjoy both truth and felicity, and, if man had never been 
anything but corrupt, he would have no idea of either truth or bliss."20 
The section on reducing the demand of morality focuses on theories which 
argue that impartiality and universalizability are not required in moral judge-
ments. Hare places feminist critiques of universality and impartiality, like 
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those of Nell Noddings and Carol Gilligan, in this category. Like the critique 
of utilitarianism in the earlier section, this way of considering Gilligan, 
Noddings, et. aI., seems slightly off-center. Though Hare cites Noddings 
arguing that we are "not obliged to care for the starving children in Africa," 
because this would require "abandon[ing] the caring" to which we are oblig-
ated, it seems that the main point of Noddings and Gilligan's arguments is 
not to pare down our ethical obligations but rather to redescribe ethical oblig-
ation and ethical action as other than the following of universalizable rules. 
In fact, a major point of Gilligan'S argument about girls' moral development, 
that they do not approach ethical problems with general rules, is to show that 
they are not less moral than boys, who do tend to apply rules, but to argue 
that they are equally but differently morally developed. I certainly agree with 
Hare's argument there is an important place for justice as well as caring in 
our close relationships, and that we have obligations beyond those to our inti-
mates, but I think the difference between the Kantian and "particularist" 
views has more to do with whether the fundamental form of moral obligation 
is through reason in Kant's sense or through the affect, caring, sympathy or 
whatever we might call it, not whether the bar of moral duty is higher or 
lower for universalists or particularists. 
Hare himself makes a very good point which goes a long way toward 
bridging the division between particularists and universalists by describ-
ing a model for acting out the obligations we have to strangers, to all 
humans. He argues that we may best work to meet this obligation by 
"being part of a community which is meeting the needs of strangers," join-
ing our resources and increasing our motivation to serve those beyond our 
ken.21 Belonging to a community might be a strategy to bridge not just the 
gap between universalist and particularist moral theories but the moral 
gap of Hare's title. The virtue theories of Aristotle, Aquinas, and, in con-
temporary ethics, MacIntyre and perhaps even Taylor, certainly rely on 
(and in the contemporary cases represent attempts to revive) the communi-
ty as a force strengthening our moral capacities and goals. 
c. "substitutes for God's assistance" 
The last theories Hare turns to are those that admit the moral gap and 
attempt to fill that gap "with some machinery external to the agent's will, 
as it were an invisible hand, which transforms egotists into useful mem-
bers of society."22 For Donald Campbell, social evolution has produced tra-
ditional religion with its altruistic ethics as a way of counterbalancing the 
biological tendency toward egoism; the two together result in or at least 
tend toward a balance that is optimal for the continuation and progress of 
society.23 Hare also considers Allan Gibbard's notion of ethics as a version 
of an evolutionary theory, as well as Gauthier's updated version of a con-
tract theory. Hare charges all three with a kind of dishonesty about the 
nature of morality. For all three theories, morality has value only instru-
mentally, but even they admit that in order for morality to work, it must be 
valued for its own sake. The belief in God to support morality is argued to 
be false but useful, and the theories themselves in effect rely on theological 
notions robbed of theological content. 
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Though he does not quite say so, Hare is criticizing these views from the 
Kantian perspective. Kant argues that we have two intuitions about moral-
ity which capture its essence; first, that it is an objective and universal 
obligation and, second, that its obligations are categorical and not hypo-
thetical. These theories all take morality to be only instrumentally valuable 
and have no convincing arguments to explain why, in Gauthier's language, 
it wouldn't be most rational to be a "free rider" rather than a full paying 
member on the moral system. 
d. Hare's conclusion 
The final section of the book attempts to explain and support what Hare 
takes to be the Christian solution to the moral gap. Hare approaches his 
own account from two directions, first, by explaining Kierkegaard's notion 
of repentence and the transition from the ethical to the religious life, sec-
ond, by offering a description of human forgiveness. These expositions 
prepare the way for Hare's theory of atonement by which Christ takes on 
and atones for human moral failure, thus filling the ethical gap. Hare's 
main contribution here is to attempt to answer Kant's objection to admit-
ting to the religion of pure reason the notion of transmissible liability, i.e., 
that someone else can pay for our sins the way someone might pay our 
financial debts. He does so by offering a series of analogies in which iden-
tities do merge to some degree allowing one member of the relationship to 
substitute for the other. He draws on the connections between mother and 
child, between friends, and even between individuals and their country. In 
all these examples, Hare contends, "the normal evaluative boundaries of 
the self" are expanded "beyond a person's skin."24 So, analogously, we can 
understand our "incorporation" into Christ and his taking over and 
redeeming our failures. The analogies are apt and show that the idea of 
Christ's atoning for human sin is not completely unintelligible. Thus, these 
analogies make the Pauline theology of the Incarnation coherent, but cer-
tainly don't constitute evidence making the Incarnation more likely or any-
thing like the only possible solution for our moral predicament. 
Hare closes by contrasting the way in which he and Kant consider the 
believer's claims to know and experience God. For Kant, of course, any 
one claiming to "feel special works of grace" or "intercourse with God" 
is a fanatic, speaking of things he cannot know or feel,25 For Kant, Hare 
contends, this makes a certain sense given his narrow sense of what we 
can claim to know, "only what we could in principle experience with the 
senses," but he implies that he shares no such narrow notion of knowl-
edge. "It will not follow," he writes, "that the Christian cannot responsi-
bily claim to have experience of God or to be united with Christ."26 The 
question which Hare does not consider is what the status of such claims 
are and how he expects them to be treated by others. While I agree with 
Hare that such claims do not fall utterly outside the boundaries of 
"meaningful assertion," they are surely different than other sorts of 
claims. Like claims of faith in the moral order, they need to be made as 
expressions of faith, not knowledge, or even justified or partly justified 
true belief. This is perhaps all Kant meant by limiting the claims of rea-
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son in order to make room for faith. 
While I cannot agree with Hare's attempt to displace the line between 
faith and knowledge, he makes an impressive case for returning this issue, as 
well as the problem of the moral gap, and the question of the Christian roots 
of Kant's ethics to prominence in philosophical and theological discourse. 
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Analytic Theism, Hartshorne, and the Concept of God by Daniel A. 
Dombrowski. State University of New York Press, 1996. Pp. xi, 247. 
SEAMUS MURPHY, Milltown Institute of Theology and Philosophy 
Process philosophy's approach to issues concerning the existence and 
nature of God has not gained much acceptance from analytic theist philoso-
phers. Daniel Dombrowski's book should go a considerable way towards 
generating more interest among analytic philosophers and, hopefully, recti-
